KaranThink41/SpinAi_Agent_Integration
highIntegration of SpinAi Agent with Hubspot Mcp server
This MCP server integrates a SpinAI agent with HubSpot to enable AI-powered CRUD operations on shared summary notes. It exposes tools to create, retri...
69app.post("/prompt", async (req, res) => {
70 try {
71 const { input } = req.body;
72 // The agent processes the input and invokes the correct MCP tool.
73 const response = await agent({ input });
74 res.json({ response });
75 } catch (error: any) {
76 res.status(500).json({ error: error.message });
77 }
78});// Network-exposed MCP server; no authentication on the /prompt endpoint, allowing remote exploitation.
The /prompt endpoint accepts arbitrary user input and passes it directly to the SpinAI agent without any validation, sanitization, or rate limiting. This allows an attacker to craft malicious prompts that could manipulate the agent into performing unintended actions via the exposed HubSpot tools.
ImpactAn attacker could send prompts that cause the agent to create, update, or delete arbitrary HubSpot notes, potentially leading to data loss, data corruption, or unauthorized data access. Since the MCP is network-exposed, this is exploitable remotely without authentication.
FixImplement input validation to restrict the prompt to expected formats. Add authentication (e.g., API key) to the /prompt endpoint. Apply rate limiting and consider using a allowlist of allowed operations or parameters.
27const agent = createAgent({
28 instructions: `You are a HubSpot assistant that can create, retrieve, update, and delete summary notes in HubSpot.
29Available tools:
30 • create_shared_summary: Accepts title, summary, and author.
31 • get_summaries: Retrieves notes using optional filters (date, dayOfWeek, limit, timeRange).
32 • update_shared_summary: Updates a note by Engagement ID or search query.
33 • delete_shared_summary: Deletes a note by Engagement ID or filters.`,
34 actions: [...hubspotActions],
35 model: openai("gpt-4o"),
36});// Network-exposed MCP server; the agent's capabilities are fully exposed to any user who can send prompts.
The agent instructions explicitly list all CRUD operations without any restrictions on which notes can be modified or deleted. Combined with the unvalidated /prompt endpoint, an attacker can instruct the agent to delete or update any note accessible via the HubSpot API token.
ImpactAn attacker could delete all shared summary notes or modify them arbitrarily, causing data loss or misinformation. The scope of the tools is not constrained to a specific set of notes or users.
FixRestrict the agent's instructions to only allow operations on notes owned by or associated with the authenticated user. Implement authorization checks within the MCP tools to ensure the agent can only operate on notes it is permitted to access.
21HUBSPOT_ACCESS_TOKEN: process.env.HUBSPOT_ACCESS_TOKEN,
22SHARED_CONTACT_ID: process.env.SHARED_CONTACT_ID,// Network-exposed MCP server; token exposure could lead to unauthorized HubSpot API access.
The HubSpot access token is loaded from an environment variable and passed to the MCP configuration. While this is a common pattern, if the environment is compromised (e.g., via server-side request forgery or file read), the token could be exposed. Additionally, the token is stored in plaintext in the environment.
ImpactAn attacker who gains access to the server's environment could retrieve the HubSpot access token and use it to directly access the HubSpot API, bypassing the MCP server entirely.
FixUse a secrets manager (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager) to store and retrieve the token at runtime. Ensure environment variables are not logged or exposed in error messages.